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is problematic. The discussions will nonetheless
potentially be of great interest to readers wanting to probe the mind-sets of conservative Muslims who seek tojustify their resistance to international human rights law, and also to readers
wanting to explore official "Islamic" rationales
for human rights violations.

remain contested. While acknowledging the frequent difficulties that arise in identifying which
groups appropriately fall within this rubric, Keal
takes as his point of departure the often-quoted
definition of "indigenous" found in a study by
the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (now the
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and ProtecANN ELIZABETH MAYER
2
Wharton School tion of Human Rights). That definition counts
as indigenous those groups that have (1) a historical continuity with precolonial societies whose
European Conquestand the Rights of Indigenous Peo- presence predated that of now dominant groups
ples: The Moral Backwardness of International living on the same territory or in close proximity,
(2) a distinctive cultural or ethnic identity that is
Society. By Paul Keal. Cambridge, New York:
connected with ancestral land, and (3) the desire
Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. ix, 258.
to transmit that identity to future generations.
Index. $70, £45, cloth; $26.99, £16.99, paper.
Following the now common trend, Keal adds to
European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous this definition the requirement of self-identification as an indigenous people.
Peoples is one of several recently published works
As this definition suggests, the history of inthat explore the place of indigenous peoples
digenous peoples is one of subjugation through
within international law and politics. Written by
colonization, which is the flip side of the rise of
Paul Keal, a fellow of the Research School of Pacific
European power around the globe-beginning
and Asian Studies at the Australian National University, it draws upon history, international rela- with Christopher Columbus's first adventure across
the Atlantic. Keal links colonization and associtions theory, and, to a lesser extent, contempoated patterns of empire with the emergence of
rary international legal texts to argue in favor of
international society, understood to be the prodrecognizing indigenous groups as "peoples" with
rights of self-determination. Placing special em- uct of the expansion of the European society of
states into one that is global in scope. The legitphasis on the proposed adoption by the UN Genimacy of international society, including the agreederal Assembly of the Draft Declaration on the
upon
norms that govern it, are brought into
Rights of Indigenous Peoples,' Keal argues that
such recognition is necessary in order to estab- question by an examination of the historical prolish the legitimacy of states and of the interna- cesses by which the society came about and the
related intellectual traditions that in one way or
tional society they constitute. He makes the case
that the international society of states is con- another encouraged those processes. Keal raises
this legitimacy question forcefully and persuastructed upon a history of empire building and
a complicit intellectual tradition that have op- sively, although without making the reader fully
aware of the extent to which he is, in fact, going
pressed indigenous peoples. The legacies of that
over ground already covered.
oppression can be reversed, according to Keal,
In his landmark 1990 book, The American Indian
only by a transformation of thinking and power
in
Western Legal Thought, Robert WilliamsJr. surrelationships based on a cross-cultural commitveyed many of the writings and lectures of major
ment to indigenous self-determination.
European thinkers and religious figures beginWithin the last few decades, groups identified
ning from the time of European encounter with
as "indigenous" have become a subject of ongothe indigenous peoples of the Americas and coning discussion within the United Nations and
other international institutions, as those groups tinuing through the ensuing period of colonization. Williams revealed how the strains of doctrine
themselves have collectively sought to achieve redress of historical and current grievances. The
2
UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discriminanomenclature of indigenous populationsor peoples
tion
and Protection of Minorities, Study of the Problem
is now commonplace, although the outer boundof Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations,
aries of the scope of its application or relevance
Vol. V., para. 379, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/Add. 4
(1986) (Jos6 Martfnez Cobo, Special Rapporteur).
3

' UN Doc. E/CN.4/SUB.2/1994/2/Add. I (1994) (reproduced in full at p. 224).

See ROBERTA. WILLIAMsJR., THEAMERICAN INDIAN
IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF
CONQUEST (1990).
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and theory espoused by well-known European
thinkers from the sixteenth century onward providedjustification and putative moral cover for the
often brutal subjugation of indigenous peoples
and for the taking of their lands. Building upon
Williams's work, other writers have shown how such
lines of thought were embraced by, and integrated
into, domestic legal systems, international law,
4
and the related international political order.
Keal devotes much of the first three chapters
of European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples to recounting the complicity of historical
European political and legal theory with the patterns of European expansion that drove the formation of an international society of states. In
many respects his account of this complicity is
more refined and perhaps more accurate than
previous ones, especially in its exposition of the
views of particular historical writers. But his
main contribution to the existing literature lies
not in uncovering the nexus between normative
strains of European thought and the spread of
European power at the expense of indigenous
peoples, as Williams and others have already
done. Instead, his innovation is in his evaluation
of that nexus in light of the works of the contemporary literature on political and international
relations theory. Keal draws on a variety of contemporary authors to weave an intricate evaluation of the logic and rhetorical devices by which
historical European thinkers justified colonization and empire building, and to show how those
justifications contaminate the normative foundations of international society. Contemporary authors who illuminate critical understandings of
cultural encounter and the intellectual foundations of the modern state system provide Keal
with a lens through which to view the writings and
lectures of de las Casas, Vitoria, Grotius, Vattel,
Westlake, and other well-known European scholars of the distant past, and to understand the
events with which those writings and lectures
were associated. With this lens Keal succeeds in
reconfirming the role of Western legal and political thought, and of many of its icons, in the devastation wrought upon indigenous peoples. In this
respect, Keal's book should help lay to rest the
persistent tendency among many to celebrate the
"founders of international law" for their relative
4 See, e.g., JAMES E. FALKOWSKI, INDIAN LAW/RACE
LAW: A FVE-HUNDRED-YEAR HISTORY (1992); PATRICK
THORNBERRY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS
61-88 (2002); S. JAME ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 9-37 (1996).

enlightenment while (unwittingly or not) ignoring or obscuring their roles in promoting and
justifying colonization.'
Underlying the actions of Europeans during
the age of encounter with non-European indigenous peoples in the Americas and elsewhere was
a pervasive perception of indigenous peoples as
morally and culturally backward and inferior.
This perception was central to European political
thought and philosophy in its various permutations, and by the end of the nineteenth century,
it had become entrenched in the doctrine of international law, as Williams and others have demonstrated. Keal explores both the various manifestations in European thought of this perception of indigenous inferiority, and he shows how
this perception was eventually embraced by international law. Stressing the role that radical cultural difference played in the development of European thought about colonization, Keal describes
the "incommensurability of cultures and the
construction of'otherness' in ways that justified
the dispossession of indigenous peoples" (p. 21).
The inability of Europeans to understand people
from non-European cultures in the others' own
terms was embedded in the major theoretical
strains of European thought that evaluated and
sought to provide direction for European expansion.
Whereas doctrines of natural law and rationalism inclined toward the view that indigenous peoples were essentially human, perceptions of indigenous peoples as inferior fed various modes
of thinking whose combined force was to deprive
indigenous peoples of the same range of entitlements to territory and cultural continuity as the
presumably superior Europeans. Keal explains
how terms such as wild men, savage, and barbarian
encapsulated diverse modes of regarding indigenous peoples as inferior. Among the erudite European thinkers, perceptions of indigenous inferiority allowed for moral understandings to be
postulated in universalist terms and at the same
time to justify, or at least not run afoul of, configurations of power that greatly disadvantaged indigenous peoples and that provided the groundwork for European expansion.
5
Cf. PAOLO G. CAROZzA, From Conquestto Constitutions:
Retrievinga Latin American Tradition of the Idea of Human Rights, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 281,289-96 (2003) (a flattering portrayal of the sixteenth-century Spanish Dominican priest Bartolom6 de las Casas and his writings
on the Indians of the Americas, without any attention to
the cultural biases in that writing as revealed by Keal
and others).
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By the same token, early assessments of, and
attitudes toward, indigenous peoples led to categorizing them as "uncivilized" and hence not part
of the "civilized" world upon which international
society was constructed, as is reflected in the major
international law treatises of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. 6 According to the
prevailing international law doctrine of that period, indigenous peoples were effectively, by definition, among the "uncivilized" and hence excluded from among the subjects of international
law. Instead, international law upheld the sovereignty of states to the exclusion of indigenous peoples' rights and offeredjustifications for the dispossession of indigenous lands. Keal describes
the main components of this historical international law doctrine to help seal his conclusion that
there is a continuing element of illegitimacy in
international society.
In the last three chapters, Keal describes contemporary developments concerning indigenous
peoples at the United Nations. Siding with the
indigenous protagonists in these developments,
he argues for reversing the legacies of the past
through recognition of indigenous groups as "peoples" with "the right to self-determination, both
within constitutional law and international or
emerging global law" (p. 217). Incorporating such
recognition into the body of norms that govern
international society, Keal argues, would substantially setde the question of the society's moral legitimacy with regard to indigenous peoples. He highlights the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, which in its Article 3 affirms,
in words that draw from the international human
rights covenants, "Indigenous Peoples have the
right of self-determination. By virtue of that right
they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development."
The Draft Declaration was developed by a working group of the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, an expert body, with broad participation by indigenous
representatives. It has been under discussion for
several years in a working group of the UN Commission on Human Rights, where its fate remains
uncertain owing in no small part to controversy
over the wording of the self-determination provision. Keal urges adoption of the Draft Declaration-with its affirmation of self-determination and related norms intact. He considers the
6 See THORNBERRY,

supra note 4, at 26-31.

supra note 4, at 72-74;
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declaration's ultimate adoption by the UN General Assembly to be a singularly important step
for curing the legitimacy deficit in international
society.
Keal is correct in understanding that the principle or right of self-determination is central to
the chorus of indigenous peoples' demands heard
at the United Nations and other venues, and that
the self-determination rhetoric embraces the core
of indigenous peoples' aspirations in the face of
historical and ongoing grievances. But in focusing on the fate of the Draft Declaration and an
explicit affirmation of a right of indigenous "peoples" to "self-determination," he succumbs to a
formalism that is uncharacteristic of the overall
method and thrust of his book, and that leads him
to overlook important other developments or to
miss their significance in relation to his project.
Keal accurately observes that indigenous peoples generally do not seek to establish their own
states but rather see self-determination as an expression of the desire to continue as distinct
groups within their traditional lands and to maintain control over their own destinies. He argues
for an understanding of self-determination along
these lines and, accordingly, advocates divorcing
self-determination from long-standing conceptual or doctrinal linkages to attributes of sovereignty and a state-centered view of the world.
Still, traditional legal rhetoric, with its formal categories, frames his ultimate argument. Ifindigenous groups gain recognition as "peoples" with
rights of" self-determination" through adoption
of the Draft Declaration, he argues, they would
then become "subjects" as opposed to "objects"
of international law and consequently gain "clear
means of appeal against the states in which they
are located" (p. 220). He does not explain why
this would be so in a practical sense, other than
to reference the generally understood relationship between UN resolutions and the consolidation of new international norms. Moreover, by
closely linking the international recognition of
indigenous peoples' rights with the adoption of the
Draft Declaration yet to come, he bypasses discussion of significant developments that have, in
fact, already led to international recognition of
indigenous group rights of the type that he, as
well as indigenous peoples themselves, associates with self-determination.
On the basis of existing international instrumental, a growing body of decisions and resolutions by various UN and regional human rights
institutions has affirmed the collective rights of
indigenous peoples in ways advocated by Keal,
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although without explicitly declaring indigenous
groups as "peoples" entitled to "self-determination." In 2001, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in theAwas Tingni case,7 upheld the
collective rights of an indigenous community to
its traditional lands against Nicaragua's assertions
of authority to control those lands for its own ends
as state-owned property. The Court's expansive
interpretation of the right to property of the
American Convention on Human Rights has been
followed in subsequent decisions by the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights in other
cases initiated by indigenous peoples.8 The UN
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has issued a general recommendation in which it interprets the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination to require that state parties recognize indigenous peoples' distinctive cultural identities and
also the collective rights associated with those
identities, including rights over lands and natural resources and to participate in all relevant
decisions. The UN Human Rights Committee
similarly has affirmed the collective rights of indigenous peoples on the basis of interpretations
of provisions of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, and has even applied
the right of self-determination that is affirmed
in general terms in Article 1 of the Covenant in
defining the scope of state responsibility toward
indigenous peoples.'
Although it may be that these and similar developments-from the late 1990s on-occurred
too late for inclusion in Keal's book, the same
cannot be said for the entry into force, well over
a decade ago, of the International Labour Organization Convention (No. 169) on Indigenous
7
Mayagna (Sumo)AwasTingni Communityv. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 79 (2001).
8 See, e.g., Dann v. United States, Case No. 11.140,
Report No. 75/02 (Inter-Am. C.H.R. Dec. 27, 2002)
(finding that the United States violated the due process
and property rights of Western Shoshone people by
inadequately addressing Western Shoshone claims to
ancestral lands); Maya Indigenous Communities v.
Belize, Case No. 12.053, Report No. 40/04 (Inter-Am.
C.H.R. Oct. 12, 2004) (finding that Belize violated the
property rights of Maya communities by granting concessions for logging and oil development on Maya traditional lands andby failing to recognize Maya rights
in those lands under domestic law).
9These and other international developments concerning indigenous peoples are summarized in S.James

Anaya, InternationalHuman Rights and Indigenous Peoples:
The Move Towardthe MulticulturalState, 21 ARIZ.J. INT'L

& COMp. L. 13 (2004), and are analyzed more extensively in S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2004).

Tribal Peoples, which Keal mentions only in passing and without attributing it much significance
for his project. The basic thrust of Convention
No. 169 is indicated by its preamble, which recognizes "the aspirations of [indigenous] peoples
to exercise control over their own institutions,
ways of life and economic development and to
maintain and develop their identities, languages
and religions, within the framework of the States
in which they live."'" Upon this premise, the Convention includes provisions advancing indigenous cultural integrity, land and resource rights,
and nondiscrimination in social welfare spheres,
and it generally demands that states respect indigenous peoples' aspirations in all decisions
affecting them. To be sure, many indigenous advocates have criticized Convention No. 169 for not
going far enough or, indeed, for being seriously
deficient. But many others, especially in Latin
America (where the Convention has been widely
ratified), have made it a prominent feature of
efforts to transform the state societies within
which they live."
Convention No. 169 ascribes collective rights
to indigenous "peoples" as such, although it includes a savings clause that denies any implication
of rights that attach to the term as used elsewhere in international law. This savings clause
was inserted to avoid taking sides in the controversial discussion of whether or not indigenous
groups are "peoples" with rights of "self-determination," in light of the common understanding
that self-determination in its fullest form means
a right to independent statehood. While thus falling short of an explicit affirmation of the right
of indigenous peoples to self-determination, the
Convention recognizes indigenous peoples as
distinct groups with certain rights as such in a way
that places those rights and conceptions of indigenous identity apart from attributes of statehood, much in the way that Keal appears to advocate in his call for an alternative conception of
self-determination. In any case, it is hard to avoid
seeing the Convention's use of the term "peoples" in its various provisions as an affirmation
" Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27,
1989, preambular para. 5 (entered into force Sept. 5,
1991), at < http://www.ilo.org>.
" See generally DONNA LEEVAN

CoTr, THE FRIENDLY

LIQUIDATION OFTHE PAST: THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY
IN LATIN AMERICA (2000) (including a discussion of the

role of Convention No. 169 in the indigenous rights
movement).
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of collective group identity and existence of the
kind at least approaching what Keal calls for. If
Keal believes otherwise, he should have provided
at least some explanation of why such a natural
interpretation of the Convention is mistaken.
Rather than highlight developments already
leading to recognition of indigenous group rights
in more or less the terms he advocates, Keal
presents a catalogue of conceptual and doctrinal
impediments to such recognition. These impediments include the uneasy place of collective rights
in human rights discourse, lingering cultural barriers, dominant strains of legal and political
thought with their foundations in classical theory, and the walls projecting from the central
edifice of state sovereignty. His analysis of these
and related impediments to international recognition of indigenous group rights is insightful
and useful, helping to explain the tensions that
are evident in the efforts to achieve that recognition and marking the challenges that must be
overcome. Yet that very analysis and his argument
for change omit an adequate account of the advances that have already occurred toward meeting these challenges.
Although it renders questionable Keal's assessment of the extent to which international law or
society still fails to recognize indigenous peoples
and their rights, his neglect of existing advances
does not undermine the force of his argument
in support of such recognition. Building on what
he argues to be the need to address the legitimacy problem of international society and the
states that constitute it, Keal demonstrates that
dominant attitudes about cultural difference, with
their historical roots, have harmed indigenous
peoples and continue to do so by reinforcing power relationships that disadvantage them. He argues that states-at least those that promoted or
have benefited from colonialism-individually and
jointly bear responsibility for the historic injustices faced by indigenous peoples. He also addresses the complex matter of intergenerational
responsibility and rebuts the proposition that
such injustices are superseded by the passage of
time. In broad and largely theoretical terms that
draw on selected writings that take critical and
postmodern approaches, Keal provides ideas on
how that responsibility can be met in order to
bring legitimacy to modern states and the international order they constitute. A first step is to
achieve awareness of, and to break down, the in-

tellectual barriers that impede cross-cultural understanding and genuine respect for diversity.
Keal discusses forms of political community that
can then be established to accommodate indigenous peoples' claims-forms that are alternatives
to the traditional Westphalian state and that embrace multiple identities and spheres of authority.
Adoption of the UN Draft Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, without changes
that would undercut its basic principles, would
no doubt be a major impetus for states and the
international system to move further in the direction that Keal advocates and that indigenous
peoples worldwide clearly want to go. That adoption would build upon and help consolidate developments that have already helped to advance
recognition of indigenous peoples and their collective rights. Keal has made a strong showing
of the justification for such recognition. He has
shed light on the intellectual traditions that contributed to the oppression of indigenous peoples, on the way in which that oppression undermines the legitimacy of states and the international society they constitute, and on what is required to remove that oppression and to advance
a global order in which all peoples-indigenous
among them--effectively enjoy self-determination.
S. JAMES ANAYA

University ofArizona, Rogers College of Law

BRIEFER NOTICE
InternationalInstitutionalLaw: Unity Within Diversity
(4th rev. ed.). Edited by Henry G. Schermers
and Niels M. Blokker. Leiden, Boston: Martinus
Nijhoff, 2003. Pp. xxxiv, 1302. Index. $386,
cloth; $92, 164, paper.
The revised fourth edition of InternationalInstitutional Law: Unity Within Diversity accomplishes
the objectives detailed in the introduction: (1) to
describe and analyze international institutional
law, thus providing a "systemic mapping" of institutional rules, (2) to contribute to improvements
in practice that may provide some guidance for
other organizations, and (3) to advance understanding of international institutional law. Like
its predecessors-published in 1972, 1980, and
1995-this version presents a wealth of material
on international institutions both carefully and
clearly. Information on specific issues is easy to locate. Although the authors give primary attention
to the United Nations and the European Union,

